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#### A. Interpretation - Economic engagement is long-term strategy for promoting structural linkage between two economies

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” [http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http%3A/polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf)

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

#### B. Violation – the plan is an economic inducement – engagement requires trade promotion

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

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#### The 1AC’s securitized approach to global problems sanitizes structural violence.

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3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### The alt is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prereq to successful policy

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

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#### CIR will pass- capital is key – allows Obama to thread the needle – there’s momemtum now

**McMorris-Santoro 10/15**

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### Immigration will pass now – momentum

**Parnes 10/18**

Amie, The Hill, Obama’s hollow debt victory, 10/18/13, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory

Another former White House official saw things differently and argued Obama now has a real shot at securing a victory on the immigration bill.¶ “The trick here is to capitalize on the moment without spiking the football,” the former official said. “On immigration, if he could tailor what he’s doing as part of functionality and not as politics, that would be key."¶ Cal Jillson, a professor of political science at Southern Methodist University said Obama could capitalize on the victory simply by seizing on a Republican Party “in disarray.”¶ On immigration, “it’s a question of whether he can develop the issue in such a way that that it’ll give them little choice,” Jillson said, adding that Obama “can make the argument that it is critical in a number of ways.”

#### Immigration reform is key to space.

**Tiger 8**

(Joseph, a J.D. candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center. He graduated from Georgetown University in 2006 with a degree in economics, “NOTE: RE-BENDING THE PAPERCLIP: AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICA'S POLICY REGARDING SKILLED WORKERS AND STUDENT VISAS,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Spring, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 507, LexisNexis)

Unlike the H-1B, the green card is a path to citizenship, which can typically be obtained after five years.170 There are a number of ways of obtaining a green card. Family reunification, as described in the Hart-Celler Act, is the primary method;17' however, under current law, green card status can be issued based on employment.' 7 2 Individuals of extraordinary talent can obtain a green card designation of EB 1, roughly the permanent counter- part to the 0-1 visa described earlier.173 Advanced degree holders can obtainEB2 status174 and those with bachelor's degrees are eligible for EB3 status.175 Like the H-1B, there are annual quotas--40,000 each for EB1, EB2, and EB3' 76 -and the application for EB2 and EB3 green card status is filed by the employer.' 77 Employment-based green cards, however, differ significantly from H-lB visas. Under H-1B, the fact that there are qualified Americans available to work is irrelevant. Under any EB status, however, the employer must show that there are no minimally qualified Americans for the position. 178 Certification of a lack of qualified Americans must be obtained from the Department of Labor.179 As a result of the improved efficiency over the past three years within the Department of Labor in processing these certifications,180 especially with the introduction of the Program Electronic Review Management system, the number of labor certifications being issued is now running up against the quotas, creating a three-year backlog of prospective EB-3 workers. 181 Just as there is a large shortage of H-1 B visas, there isalso a large shortage of employment-based green cards.In fact, the shortage of employment-based green cards is more severe than the numbers above might suggest. The law specifies that no one country may receive more than 7% of EB visas,182 which is very problematic for countries such as India, China, Mexico, and the Philippines, which are considered "oversubscribed" to the program.183 In 2006, Senator John Comyn (R-TX) introduced the Securing Knowledge and Innovation and Leadership Act (the "SKIL Bill") as part of the compre- hensive immigration reform passed that year by the Senate.' 84 It was included as part of S. 2611, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006,185 but S. 2611 was never reconciled with its House counterpart, H.R. 4337. Senator Cornyn reintroduced it as a stand-alone bill in 2007 and it is still in committee as of April 12, 2008.186 The SKILBill would address many of the problems faced by foreign students on F-1 visas upon graduation. Among other provisions, the SKIL Bill would raise the H-iB quota to 115,000, with a 20% increase automatically occurring each year the cap is reached,1 87 and holders of advanced degrees in science and mathematics would not be counted toward the quota.1 88 Additionally, the employment- based green card system would be reformed, increasing the numeric cap to 290,000, and dependents would not be counted toward the quota, nor would recipients of advanced degrees from American universities. 189 The new exemption for dependents would effectively double the number of visas available.190 OPT would also be extended to two years for all students and employers would be able to file for employment-based green card status during the OPT period. 91 However, the student would still be obliged to work, at least temporarily, in a career directly related to the major course of study.192 The SKIL Bill was introduced before the recent changes to OPT by USCIS and it remains to be seen whether the bill will be amended to reflect the extended OPT now available to STEM majors. Once the application was submitted and the petition for permanent residence was in place, however, the student on OPT could file for a work permit.193 The SKIL Bill would significantly alleviate the current problems, although the number of H-lB visas made available might still be inadequate, particularly if demand for them increases at a rate greater than the 20% annual increase built into the bill. Additionally, the oversubscription problem remains, which could be especially serious for Indian and Chinese students whose countrymen make up a disproportionate percentage of permanent employment-based visa holders. 194 The increase in length of OPT would make obtaining and converting either to an H-1B or to a green card substantially easier for students on F-I visas. The SKIL Bill, endorsed by both the Council of Graduate Schools195 and the Information Technology Association of America,196 addresses the two main problems facing foreign students at American universities-the timing of H-lB visas relative to graduation, and the period between graduation and the beginning of the fiscal year. It addresses the first through substantial increases in H-lB and EB quotas and exemptions from the quotas, and the second through extension of OPT for all students and permission to file for green card status directly out of OPT. Senator Hagel's High-Tech Worker Relief Act temporarily addresses the first problem but does not deal with the second. In fact, there are innumerable ways in which these problems can be addressed. At some level, each proposal will likely involve some form of increase in quotas, either through a direct increase in the number or by exempting students from the quotas. Conceivably, the problem of the graduation date being later than the availability of visas could be dealt with by delaying the first date petitions for H-1B visas are accepted, from the beginning of April until the beginning of May or June, so that students would have a chance to compete. For the foreign student and for America's own self-interest, the best solution to these problems would be a combination of reforms to the policies governing green cards and H-lB visas; addressing one system but not the other would be less than optimal. For example, America could offer all foreign students H-lB visas, but those who choose to pursue U.S. citizenship (allowable under the dual-intent provisions of this visa) would still have to obtain a green card. Further, increases in the number of H-1B visas issued would soon bump up against the green card quotas unless those quotas were also raised. Offering all students green cards but not H-lB visas would be even more problematic. If all students were made automatically eligible for EB status upon graduation, acceptance at an American university would, in essence, constitute a near guarantee of future citizenship. Thus, to maintain its power to control citizenship, the government would have to exercise even stricter control over the granting of student visas. These procedural hurdles could act as a disincentive if not an actual barrier to foreign students interested in studying at American universities. 197 Additionally, working under a green card has procedural hurdles of its own, not associated with the H-1B visa program (notably, labor certification). As such, foreign students who do not wish to stay in the United States beyond a temporary period of work would face the choice of accepting the green card and becoming a permanent resident, or leaving immediately upon the termination of F-I status.' Furthermore, in terms of America's own interest, some fields of study, such as aerospace engineering or physics, are more valuable in terms of supply and demand than others, such as the liberal arts. The issue is not that science and technology are superior to the liberal arts, but that there are far fewer American students majoring in science and technology than in the liberal arts. Policies governing foreign students in America should take into account this disequilibrium. Upon graduation from American universities, those foreign students whose presence would constitute a real benefit to America should be presented with three long-term options: accept an H-lB temporary work visa, accept EB green card status, or return to their native countries. The question is: which students are desirable? Although there is obviously no easy answer, the United States might be guided by the policies of Australia and Canada, which have set up general skill-based immigration systems.19 8 Their laws are modified regularly to reflect the changing demands of the economy. General skill-based immigration is beyond the scope of this article, but a similar system could be applied with relative ease to America's student visa system. It might be argued (as a topic for another paper) that any quotas set on foreign students and foreign workers with desired skill sets are counterproduc- tive to the interests of America. However, as a potentially better alternative within a system that does employ quotas, Congress could delegate to a bipartisan committee199 the authority to determine which skill sets are deemed desirable now and in the future given the overall direction of the United States' economy. Such a committee would make its decisions based on economic studies, analysis of macroeconomic trends, and input from private industry. These determinations would be summarized in a statement outlining recommended policies for the special issuance of H-lB visas and green cards to foreign students in areas of academic concentration deemed desirable (possibly with specific quotas set for each of these fields of study); in contrast, foreign students majoring in other subjects would have to compete for H-lB visas and green cards issued within the limits of their respective general quotas. There is some parallel in the self-adjusting system in place. That is, the overall state of economy should be reflected by which employers make filings, on behalf of their prospective employees, for EB status or H-1B visas. However, the cap distorts the theoretically optimal results that one would otherwise expect to see. When too many applications for H- lB visas are filed at once, a lottery determines who gets the visas; consequently, visas are granted on a random basis rather than a basis directed at helping to meet America's current and anticipated needs. Employment-based green cards are granted on a first-come, first-served system, and there is currently a three- year backlog for the EB3 visa, creating a time lag in meeting America's needs. By delegating such authority to an expert committee, the federal govern- ment could retain control over immigration while resolving many of the above-described problems. Obviously, if Congress disagrees with the commit- tee's decisions or wishes to promote an agenda outside of the scope of the committee, it always retains the power to.pass laws granting certain foreign students the option of remaining in this country. For example, even if the price of fossil fuels were low and there were little motivation to invest in alternative energy by the private sector, Congress, concerned about the national security implications of dependence on foreign oil, could permit students with expertise in green energy to remain in the United States. Such a system would have the advantage of guaranteeing either an H-iB visa or an EB green, card to students upon graduation, conditional upon them finding employment, while retaining federal control of the immigration system. V. CONCLUSION Foreign students at America's universities face real problems upon graduation. Many graduating seniors are unable to obtain H-lB visas and are notlegally eligible for EB3 status given that the F-1 student visa does not permit dual intent. Additionally, those students who do receive H- lB visas are often unable to begin work until the beginning of the fiscal year. These problems could be addressed by reform of either the H-1B program or the green card system. The SKIL bill is an ambitious and comprehensive attempt to address many of the issues facing foreign students at American universities wishing to work in the United States upon graduation.The days when immigrants were merely manual labor have passed. Operation Paperclip heralded a new era of competition for talent among post-industrial nations moving toward innovation- and knowledge-based economies. The country that can attract the finest minds of the world will be at the forefront of innovation and technology.On December 14, 1972, Eugene Ceman of the Apollo 17 mission became the last man to walk on the moon. Since the end of the Apollo program, manned American spaceflight has been carried out using the space shuttle, which cannot travel past low Earth orbit.201 In 2004, with spectacular images coming from the unmanned Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, President George W. Bush announced his Vision for Space Exploration, which calls for the development of new manned spacecraft to return to the Moon and to reach Mars.202 As part of Project Constellation, NASA hopes to return Americans to the Moon by 2020 and continue further into space with manned missions to Mars by 2037.203America has become the world leader in technology and science by attracting brilliant minds from all over the world rather than relying solely on native talent. Wernhervon Braun, a German immigrant, headed the team that designed the rocket system that carried the Apollo astronauts to the Moon.It would be unfortunate if the success of Project Constellation were compromised due to problems in America's visa programs. Talented foreign stu- dents, drawn to America by her extraordinary university system, represent an enormous asset that must not be squandered.

#### Solves inevitable human extinction

**Objective Observer ‘3**

(“The Case for Colonizing Mars”, July, http://www.theobjectiveobserver.com/articles/space01.shtml)

Homo sapiens, human beings, have to be one of the least intelligent species on the planet. I realize that this statement flies in the face of most scientific evidence given the large brain capacity of homo sapiens, the use of tools by homo sapiens and the fact that homo sapiens can engage in abstract thought. However, all of these traits make it that much more unlikely and fantastic that homo sapiens as a species continue to largely ignore the colonization of Mars. Onesimple fact screams out for human beings to colonize Mars with all due haste. That fact makes it crystal clear that the Earth has a deplorable track record when it comes to its ability to support life. Consider that 99.9% of all species that have ever existed on planet Earth are extinct. Now, when you look at that fact, please also consider that this does not mean that .1% of species have survived since the dawn of time. The .1% figure simply represents species that have yet to go extinct. In other words, we happen to have some species alive and thriving on the Earth today. Those species by and large evolved relatively recently. Thus, the .1% figure is not really a survival rate but rather a percentage of all species that have ever existed on the Earth that currently happen to be alive. Another way of viewing this is in terms of survival rate as a function of time instead of as a function of species. If we were to look at all species that have existed during the last 10 years, the survival rate would be close to or at 100%. In other words, of all the species that have existed on planet Earth for the last 10 years, no extinctions have occurred. If we were to look at species that have existed for the last 1,000 years that 100% figure would drop slightly due to extinctions such as the dodo and the passenger pigeon. Looking at the survival rate species that have existed for the last 10,000 years, that 100% figure would be even less and as we go further and further back in time, the survival rate would approach or become zero. Therefore, we can state as a certainty that the longer a species exists on the Earth, the more likely it becomes that that species will become extinct and this continues until that species’ extinction is a certainty. What causes these extinctions? Irrelevant. I am not here to debate the cause of animal extinctions. There are many theories regarding why extinctions occur. The most popular today being that asteroids and/or comets randomly strike the Earth every millennia or so and serve as a first strike that initiates extinction. Asteroids and comets are currently blamed for many of Earth’s mass extinctions throughout its history. However, regardless of whether extinctions occur by asteroid, by comet or by some other as yet unknown device, the fact that 99.9% of species that have ever existed on the Earth are extinct remains the same. Consider also that human beings are on the top of the food chain, quite similar to dinosaurs in their day. Why is this relevant? Well, for one simple fact. Land extinctions tend to kill off the large, dominate animals at the top of the food chain while some of the smaller animals near the bottom of the food chain survive. Oddly enough, mass extinctions seem to happen in reverse in the ocean, the smaller animals at the bottom of food chain become extinct and the ones at the top of food chain tend to survive. This may actually explain why intelligence evolved first on land instead of in the oceans, but that is the subject of a different essay. Of course, one might argue that there has never been a species of animal on the Earth that was so intelligent, so diverse and so well adapted to its environment as are homo sapiens. Thus, the argument is that if there is going to be a species that survives a mass extinction, homo sapiens have the best chance. However, this argument is rather full of logical errors in reasoning. First, in terms of diversity and adaptation, homo sapiens rather pale in comparison to other successful organisms such as all of the species of dinosaurs. Second, there is absolutely no evidence that intelligence has anything to do with surviving a mass extinction. Thus, we have a few simple scientific facts that human beings have been quite aware of for several decades that make it perfectly clear to any reasonable mind that human beings WILL become extinct if they remain solely on planet Earth. And yet, human beings by and large are doing very little to colonize Mars. And by very little, I do not mean to denigrate those individuals that have written on this subject or those at NASA and other agencies around the world that are working right now on all of the problems associated with colonizing Mars. However, what I am proposing is to make the colonization of Mars a priority of the United States and world governments second only to national defense. This last argument is sure to spark protests and outrage from many different sectors I am sure. I can hear the arguments now. “We have enough problems to solve here on Earth first before we start trying to colonize other planets.” “Why not put resources into deflecting or destroying asteroids and comets instead of colonizing Mars?” “We do not have the technology to colonize Mars.” “Why not colonize the oceans?” Why not colonize the Moon?” “We have no evidence that colonizing Mars will avoid human extinction.” I will address each of the arguments in turn. “We have enough problems to solve here on Earth first before we start trying to colonize other planets.” This statement is very true, human society is fraught with all kinds of problems. However, all other problems pale in comparison to the extinction of the species. The reason is simple. If homo sapiens as a species becomes extinct, all other problems are irrelevant. “Why not put resources into deflecting or destroying asteroids and comets instead of colonizing Mars?” This one is quite simple. First, one should know that we probably only know of about 5% of the asteroids and/or comets that pose a severe threat to the Earth. If one of those asteroids within that 5% was going to hit the Earth, we would have some warning; maybe enough to come up with and successfully execute a plan to deflect it. However, for the other 95%, we would have little or no warning. Second, we do not know for a certainty that asteroids or comets cause mass extinctions. We have some pretty good evidence that points to this, but nothing certain. Mass extinctions might be caused by viruses or some as yet unknown device. The only certainty in preserving the human species is to expand beyond the bounds of planetEarth. “We do not have the technology to colonize Mars”. Yes we do. We are 100 or perhaps a 1,000 times more prepared today to tackle the problem of Mars colonization than we were to tackle the problem of landing on the moon. Our society is perhaps the best prepared it has ever been throughout its entire history to tackle such an exploration and colonization. Quite simply, we have the technology today to begin terraforming and permanently colonizing Mars. In addition, it has already been proven that when nations make certain well-defined goals and objectives top priority, the problem is solved with surprising rapidity. This can be seen with the development of the atomic bomb as well as the Apollo program to land on the moon. “Why not colonize the oceans?” This argument stems from the fact that ocean extinctions tend to occur in reverse of land extinctions. That is, the big, dominant animals at the top of the food chain tend to survive ocean mass extinctions. First, human beings are not native to the oceans and therefore, the normal “rules” would not apply. Second, big, dominant animals do go extinct in the oceans. Third, 99.9% of all species that have ever inhabited the earth, on land and on water have gone extinct. Expanding to an ocean environment does not change that fact. “Why not colonize the Moon?” Indeed, this seems reasonable. It gets our species off of planet Earth and the Moon is a lot closer than Mars. However, the Moon lacks the ability to support a self-sustaining human colony. A Moon colony would be much too dependent on Earth for its very existence. This does not mean that we should not pursue a permanent Moon colony. Indeed, a permanent Moon colony may be a crucial step in colonizing Mars. However, a Moon colony cannot serve as a replacement for Mars colonization. “We have no evidence that colonizing Mars will avoid human extinction.” This is absolutely true. However, we know for a fact that it is a certainty that if we remain solelyon planet Earth we will go extinct. We also know that creating a self-sustaining colony on another planet is the best and perhaps only way to avoid extinction. And Mars is the most likely candidate within our solar system for colonization.

### solvency

#### No cyber war and no impact – their ev is just hype

**CATO 11 –** (CATO institute, “The Underwhelming Threat of Cyberterrorism,” January/February 2011, http://www.cato.org/policy-report/januaryfebruary-2011/underwhelming-threat-cyberterrorism)//a-berg

The problem with “cybersecurity,” says Jim Harper, director of information policy studies at the Cato Institute, is that we’re convincing ourselves that cyberspace is an endless sea of vulnerabilities that leave us weak and exposed. It’s not. Harper has emerged as the voice of reason among breathless news reports of “cyber attacks” and calls for Washington to take over security of the nation’s computing infrastructure. In his papers, congressional testimonies, and numerous media appearances, Harper emphasizes the need to better understand the nature of cyberspace, to appreciate the improvements in cybersecurity civil society is constantly generating, and to recognize the near impossibility that terrorists might inflict significant harm using computers. “It’s helpful to imagine ‘cyberspace’ as organized like the physical world,” Harper says. “Think of personal computers as people’s homes. Their attachments to the network analogize to driveways, which connect to roads and then highways. E-mails, financial files, and pictures are the personal possessions that could be stolen out of houses and private vehicles, leading to privacy loss.” Cyberspace will be secured the way real space is. Computer owners, like homeowners and businesses, should be the first line of protection for their own property, Harper says. They should install the latest patches and place their systems behind firewalls. What the government wants — to come up with a national cybersecurity plan and force it upon network, data, and computer owners — is akin to cutting down crime in neighborhoods by stationing police officers in livingrooms and dictating what sorts of door locks and alarm systems must be in all new homes. “The analogy between cyberspace and real space shows that ‘cybersecurity’ is not a small universe of problems, but thousands of different problems that will be handled in thousands of different ways by millions of people,” Harper says. This analogy is particularly important when the topic shifts from broad “cybersecurity” to the narrower threat of “cyberterrorism.” The popular view of such attacks, like WarGames, is nonsense, according to Harper. “With communications networks, computing infrastructure, and data stores under regular attack from a variety of quarters — and regularly strengthening to meet them — it is highly unlikely that terrorists can pull off a cybersecurity event disruptive enough to instill widespread fear of further disruption,” Harper says. If they could do it at all, taking down websites, interrupting financial networks, or knocking out power systems does not terrorize. In a 2009 speech about cybersecurity, President Obama spoke about “weapons of mass disruption,” a poor relation of the instruments that truly threaten violence and chaos. The federal government plays a significant role in protecting Americans from genuine terrorism. And, even though the threat of cyberterrorism is dramatically overblown, the government can improve security in that area, too. But it should not do so through regulation, Harper says. Instead, it can take advantage of its position as a large purchaser of information technology and, through the market, guide technology producers to meet better security standards. The politicians in Washington should realize that the easiest way to protect critical data and infrastructure is not to make it vulnerable in the first place. “Where security is truly at a premium,” Harper says, “the lion’s share of securing infrastructure against cyberattack can be achieved by the simple policy of fully decoupling it from the Internet.” Harper’s level-headedness is getting attention. The Obama White House cited a paper he wrote in the executive summary of its Cyberspace Policy Review. In it, Harper argued that updating tort law to allow those harmed by insecure computer products to recover damages from providers and manufacturers is a better path to true security than government regulation of the market. And he was called before the House Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation to testify about how the federal government should respond to cyberterrorist threats and how it should approach securing the nation’s informationtechnology infrastructure. Harper is adamantly clear that cybersecurity is important. While arguing that the federal government should not directly regulate computer security, he is careful not to downplay the need to secure our computer networks. But such security, like in the brick and- mortar world outside the Internet, is a matter of personal responsibility, business interest, and common sense. That same common sense should lead us to recognize that cyberterrorism does not exist and that threat of cyberwarfare is minimal. Claims to the contrary result from technological illiteracy and the incentives of government officials and contractors that favor inflating threats. Cyberterrorism is “cyber–snake oil,” Harper says.

### deterrence

#### Deterrence rewards brinksmanship leading to rapid escalation

Trachtenberg 2002 (Marc, Prof. Pol. Sci. – UCLA, The National Interest, “Waltzing to Armageddon?” Fall, L/N, MT)

Waltz does not approach the problem this way. For him, wars are started by one side or another. There is an attacker and a defender; with nuclear weapons, the attacker is deterred and war is avoided. "Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense", he asks, "who will dare to start them?" The Soviet Union would have been deterred by any state that might have been able to deliver one or two simple fission bombs on Moscow. Indeed, he argues, "with nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred by another state's second-strike forces." "A nation", he says, "will be deterred from attacking even if it believes there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate." There is no doubt in Waltz's mind about this; for him, the deterrent effect is absolute: no one will start a war, and wars-at least major wars, wars in which nuclear weapons will be used-will simply not happen. In the real world, however, wars are often not simply "started" by one side, and the distinction between defender and attacker can be very problematic. In 1914, for example, who "started" the First World War? Germany, by invading Belgium and attacking France? Or Russia, by ordering general mobilization a few days earlier, knowing full well that such action made war virtually inevitable? Who was the "defender"? Austria, supported by Germany, for trying to prevent Serbia from serving as a base for terrorist activities directed against the Habsburg Monarchy? Or Russia, supported by the Western powers, for trying to defend Serbian sovereignty and maintain its own political position in the Balkans? And if all the major powers had been armed with nuclear weapons at the time, is it clear who exactly would have been deterred? Or take the case of the coming of World War II in 1939. If both Britain and Germany had been nuclear powers at the time, again, is it clear who would have been deterred? Waltz thinks that Germany would have backed off: Hitler would not have "started" a war that would destroy the Third Reich. But Hitler did not intend to "start" a war with Britain at that point; his aim was to get Britain to back down in the confrontation over Poland. Nor did Britain intend to start a war with Germany. War broke out not because either side wanted war in late 1939, but rather because neither was willing to give way-and because each was hoping that the other would. Once we get away from the idea that wars are simply "started" by one side and that the "attacker" can be readily identified, the whole problem appears in an entirely different light. If war is seen as the outcome of a process in which two sides interact, it makes no sense to focus simply on the calculations of just one side. Instead, the calculations of both sides, and especially their calculations about each other, have to be taken into account. Each side may be trying to deter the other-to get its way without war if it can. Each side might be afraid of escalation, but those fears are balanced by the knowledge that one's adversary is also afraid, and his fears can be exploited. In the case of a conflict between two nuclear powers, if either side believed that Waltz's analysis was correct-if either side believed that its adversary would give way rather than run any risk of nuclear attack, as long as his vital interests were not threatened-there would be no reason for that country not to take advantage of that situation. That side could threaten its adversary with nuclear attack if its demands were not met in the firm belief that its opponent was bound to give way, and that it would therefore not be running any risk itself. That belief might turn out to be correct, but if it were not-if its rival was unwilling to allow it to score such an easy victory-there could be very serious trouble indeed. And if both sides were convinced by Waltz's arguments, and both adopted strong deterrent strategies, the situation would be particularly dangerous. Each side would dig in its heels, convinced that when confronted with the risk of nuclear war, the other side would ultimately back down. Such a situation could quickly get out of hand. As Dean Rusk pointed out in 1961, "one of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight." This is an extreme case, but it illustrates the problem. In the real world, states will not be so sure that their opponent "will be deterred" by the prospect of nuclear war and that they can therefore go as far as they like in a political dispute-say, in the Cold War case, in a dispute over Cuba or Berlin. Nor will they themselves, in all probability, be absolutely deterred by the threat of nuclear war. They would be under a certain competitive pressure to play the same game as their rivals; their rivals could not be allowed to profit so easily from a simple threat-making strategy while themselves running no real risk at all. Each side would be afraid of escalation, but each side would in the final analysis also be willing to run a certain risk. Each side would know that its adversary was also worried about what would happen if things got out of hand, and that an unwillingness to run any risk at all would remove that element of restraint and give the adversary too free a hand. Each side would know that its adversary was probably also willing to run a certain risk for the same reason, which is why each side could not be sure that its opponent would be deterred in a confrontation. In such situations, it is impossible to say how all these calculations would sort themselves out. Deterrence cuts in more than one way, and it for this reason that in a nuclear world, no one can know how far things will go before a conflict is resolved, or whether it even can be resolved before nuclear weapons are actually used. Each side may calculate that if it is just a bit tougher, its opponent may back down. Having gone so far, wouldn't it make sense to go further still? And there is no natural end-point to that process. For Waltz, if deterrence fails, "a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation." But it is just as likely that if a few bombs are exploded, the country that had been targeted would choose to retaliate in kind. It might even choose to escalate the conflict. A political dispute can thus become a gigantic poker game, with each side raising the stakes in the hope that its opponent, frightened by the prospect of nuclear war, will fold before things go too far. Conflicts in such a world, as Thomas Schelling argued years ago, would become "contests in risk-taking." The side with the greater resolve, the side more willing to run the risk of nuclear war, has the upper hand and will prevail in a showdown. In the pre-nuclear world, more or less objective factors-above all, the balance of military power-played a key role in determining how political conflicts ran their course. The weak tended to give way to the strong; in an admittedly rough and imperfect way, the military balance gave some indication as to how a dispute would be worked out. But in a world of invulnerable nuclear forces, as Waltz points out, the military balance counts for little. Subjective factors, like will and resolve, would play the key role in determining how political conflicts are worked out. The result is that in such a world there would be a great premium on resolve, on risk-taking, and perhaps ultimately on recklessness. In international politics, as in other areas of life, what you reward is what you get. Resolve would tend to harden, and the parties involved would tend to dig in their heels. A reputation for toughness would be of fundamental importance, since one has to worry not just about the present but about the future, and this would provide further incentive to take a tough stand. And as each side hardens its position, its rival is also led by competitive pressure to do the same. Why would anyone think that a world of that sort, where political outcomes are up for grabs and victory goes to the side with the strongest nerves, would be particularly stable?

#### Deterrence breaks down- leader failure, crisis time, war planning, and fog of war

**Cimbala 08** (Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia Author: Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State, [Comparative Strategy](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713769613), Volume [27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713769613~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D27#v27), Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg791929845) March 2008 , pages 113 - 132 Abstract Pismarov)

The figures show that even assured destruction forces or purely existential deterrent forces have some problems of crisis instability, especially under unfavorable conditions of alertness and launch doctrines. Forces that require flexible targeting or other capabilities beyond assured destruction will feel pressured to ignore the danger of crisis instability and increase their reliance on generated alert and prompt launch. Reliance on hair triggered forces can create its own dependency that skews war plans and decision makers' expectations about the failure of deterrence. This dependency illustrates one possibly perverse way in which the characteristics of forces deployed interact with vertical proliferation (the sizes of forces) and horizontal proliferation (the numbers of nuclear states) to create crisis time friction and the “fog of war” to the detriment of stable deterrence. Conclusions   From the standpoint of military strategy, anticipatory attacks may be a necessary evil. They cannot be excluded from the tool kits of policymakers and military planners. On the other hand, preemption and preventive options must be used with care. Even when they are employed with favorable military results, anticipatory attacks can have undesirable political side effects. And the history of warfare suggests that anticipatory attacks can invite all of the “fog of war” and “friction” that Clausewitz warned about. Nuclear anticipatory attacks raise issues in addition to conventional ones. Although the Cold War witnessed no nuclear anticipatory attacks, it was marked by several nuclear crises in which the latent or manifest threat of anticipatory nuclear strikes was present. Deterrence based on preemptive threat of nuclear attack is less fault tolerant than deterrence based on the threat of conventional preemption. Although the psychology of deterrence may seem the same in both cases, the consequences of misjudgment are potentially much more catastrophic for a mistaken nuclear preemption. In addition, shorter timelines and greater confusion on the part of national leaders are almost inevitable for nuclear, compared to conventional, first strikes.

#### No US-China war --- cooperation

**Rosecrance et al 10** (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

#### No Impact- Iranian prolif stabilizes the region – creates a counter to Israeli nukes.

**Kaye & Wehrey, 07** [Dalia Dassa Kaye, Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, Frederic M. Wehrey, International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,” Survival, 49: 2, 111-128] camp

Public opinion in the Arab world is largely sympathetic to an Iranian nuclear option, viewing it as a counter to Israel and a way to overcome the perceived double standard of allowing Israel, but not others in the region, to get away with the bomb.55 Turkish public opinion also does not perceive Iran or the nuclear issue in particular as a threat, nor does the current Islamist leadership in Ankara (serious concerns are largely limited to the Turkish military).56 Some regional security elites also expressed some acceptance, and even benefits, of a nuclear Iran, although they are more inclined to recognise the accompanying dangers than the public at large. In Jordan, for example, some strategic analysts suggested that Iran could serve as a balance to Israel and suggested that many in the region view the issue this way.57 A high-level Jordanian official raised the example of South Asia to suggest that the nuclear tests actually had a stabilising regional effect by leading to a renewed peace effort.58 Interestingly, one Israeli analyst also suggested that a bilateral nuclear balance between Israel and Iran – while dangerous in many other ways – could also lead to political agreements by putting more pressure on Israel to deal with Syria and Lebanon.59 In the Gulf, regional tolerance of a nuclear-armed Iran is even more likely, particularly by Oman. Given its long history of economic and cultural interdependence with Iran, Muscat has adopted the most accomodating posture of all the Gulf states. A retired Omani military commander pointed to Iran’s pre- revolutionary support of Oman during the 1970s insurgency in the western Dhofar region, arguing for a degree of continuity in neighbourly relations that would overcome Iran’s belligerent rhetoric or regional fears of a ‘Shia bomb’.60 Why should we be more afraid of a nuclear-armed Iran than a nuclear Pakistan?’ this same official asked. In contrast to fears of an emboldened Iran, he believed that a nuclear-armed Iran would incur increased economic burdens and that its conventional forces would atrophy. A Kuwaiti scholar echoed this prediction of economic decline, arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran, faced with increased isolation and sanctions, warranted increased Kuwaiti investment in anti-smuggling capabilities, to counter the anticipated spike in Iranian black-market activity.61

#### Their discursive construction of a “China threat” makes war inevitable

**Pan, 04** – Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University (Chengxin, 2004, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, 29, pp. 305-331, JSTOR, Hensel)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides.

### econ

#### Economic threat predictions are a means of political ordering under the guise if military subjugation—all who don’t conform to the economic order are slaughteredNeocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, p95- MT)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its **economic strength**– in order **to** **re-order the world**. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped **co-opt the liberal Left** into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, **on pain of extinction**, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant **reshaping of world order** and resulting in a comprehensive level of **intervention and policing all over the globe**. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently **violent strategy**. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘**rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states** on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the **slaughter bench of history**. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow anygovernment in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of con tainment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

#### The economy is resilient and the impact is empirically denied

**Zakaria, ‘9** - Fareed (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2>]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### No bioterrorism and no impact

**Mueller 10** [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

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#### There is no status quo- the 1AC advantages are just random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. They merely take a snapshot of a dynamic status quo and attempt to portray it as a static universality. The impact is that solvency is a rigged game- construction of the advantages presupposes the necessity of the plan-risk assessment means you vote negative to avoid error replication.

Dillon & Reid 2000 (Michael Dillon and Julian Reid  Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency. By: Dillon, Michael, Reid, Julian, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 03043754, Jan-Mar2000, Vol. 25, Issue 1)

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is **prescribed and policed** in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby **creates a market for policy**, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the **inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions** that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely **the control that they want**. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

#### Their framework arguments make violence inevitable by isolating the K by being outside the acceptable realm of political discourse.

DuRand 2003 (Dr. Cliff DuRand is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Morgan State University in Baltimore, Maryland.  This paper was presented February 14, 2003 in a public lecture series sponsored by Biblioteca Publica in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico. <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/aip/future.htm>, MT)

The main point I want to make about that era is that the climate of fear was deliberately induced by our political elite in order to mobilize a frightened population into supporting its anti-communist crusade. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals alike sought to purge Leftists from the political life of the nation so there could be no dissenting voices from a Cold War to  protect capitalism and ensure U.S. hegemony in the world. Never mind that a nuclear arms race made us less secure, that in the name of anti-communism our government sought to crush every progressive movement that emerged anywhere in the world, and that the scope of political discourse at home was limited to a narrow range. A fearful population was willing to accept all this and  more. Fear induced an unquestioning, childlike trust in a political elite that promised to protect us from harm. As the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes well understood, those with sufficient fear for their lives, liberties and property will be willing to turn all that over to an all powerful Leviathan in hopes of finding security. The politics of fear has governed our national life ever since. With the end of the Cold War up until 911, there was a hiatus.  Without a communist bogeyman to scare us with anymore, the national security state was faced with a legitimization crisis. How could it justify its interventions  against Third World countries? How could it justify continued high levels of military expenditures? How could it sustain the powers of an imperial presidency? Without  an enemy, without a threat to fear, how could the political elite mobilize public support? Through the 1990s you could see it grasping for a new enemy for us to fear. A  war on drugs was offered as cover for interventions in the Andean countries and in Panama, even though the problem of drugs had its roots here at home. We were  told to fear crime (at a time when crime rates were actually decreasing) so we would support draconian police and sentencing practices that have given us the  highest prison population in the industrial world. But the most ludicrous of all was the propaganda campaign launched by the Pentagon to try to convince us that we  were threatened by a possible asteroid that could crash into the earth, destroying all life. To protect against that, we needed to develop space laser weapons that  could destroy an oncoming asteroid first. Thus did the military-industrial complex seek to frighten us into supporting the development of star wars weaponry.  But  none of that could quite do what the political elite needed. Finally, in 2001 on September 11 a spectacular mass terrorist crime gave them a new threat for us to fear.  Quickly interpreting it as an act of war rather than a crime, the most reactionary sector of the elite declared war on an undefined enemy - a war without end. They  offered us something new to fear so we would need the protection they claimed to offer. And they have played the politics of fear masterfully. With frequent alerts,  high visibility security measures, constant reminders of vulnerabilities, an atmosphere of fear has been maintained even in the absence of further real attacks. In his  January 29 State of the Union address, George W. Bush fed our fear with these words: "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans, this time  armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." The  operative word here is 'imagine.' By fueling a fevered imagination, he promotes a "servile fearfulness", to use Shakespeare's phrase.   This has enabled this reactionary sector of the elite to not only win acceptance of unprecedented regressive policies domestically, with passive acceptance by the rest of the elite, but now push through a war against a country that didn't even have anything to do with terrorism.  Again, we can see how fear can be a potent political force in the hands of skilled political leaders.

#### Political rhetoric comes first and creates political reality framing our understanding - this card will smoke them.

Hinds & Windt Jr. 1991 (Lynn Boyd, is Associate Professor of Broadcasting at West Virginia University. and Theodore Otto, Professor of Political Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh. “The Cold War As Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945–1950,” 1991, 6-10, MT)

The primary materials for this examination are the central rhetorical texts that formulated the American cold war consensus in the United States. Our concern is with what Professor Richard Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh has called the "generic moment," a time when perception and rhetoric come together to produce policy, and in the case of the cold war, to produce a universal doctrine. Our theme is taken from Walter Lippmann. In *Public Opinion,*he wrote: For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.[14](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) If one were to add "political leaders" to "culture," one would have the orientation to what follows in this book. Definitions require language both to conceive of reality and to express it, and the kind of language people use then shapes the ways in which they see the world. Choosing one set of words to define reality rather than another not only orients people, it also creates a grammar that structures reality and then expands into a rhetoric that justifies that reality. Our thesis is that political rhetoric creates political reality, and in the case of the American cold war, the universal rhetoric created in the aftermath of World War II created a universal reality. Words and arguments chosen to justify policies took on lives of their own which eventually meant -- especially in the late 1940s and in the 1950s -- that perceptions, opinions, attitudes, policies, and even the way people lived, had to be adjusted more or less (and usually more) to be consistent with this universal rhetoric. No more eloquent example of rhetoric taking on its own life can be found than in the history of George F. Kennan's famous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Originally written as a private memorandum for James V. Forrestal and based on his private "long telegram," Kennan's article, when published in *Foreign Affairs,* became the living doctrine of containment. Kennan recorded in his *Memoirs* that he watched with great anguish as his term containment "was picked up and elevated, by common agreement of the press, to the status of a 'doctrine', which was then identified with the foreign policy of the administration." [15](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) He went on to note that he felt "like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster." [16](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Such was the vitality of Kennan's language and rhetoric. And so too were the vitality and life of Churchill's "Iron Curtain," Truman's Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a variety of other rhetorical acts that when taken together comprise the American version of the cold war reality. METHODS OF ANALYSIS Political rhetoric creates the arena of political reality from which political thought and action proceed. Such a statement has become commonplace. [17](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Political language and arguments -- in sum, political rhetoric -- create political consciousness, define political settings, create national identity, stimulate people to act, and give sense and purpose to these actions. [18](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Political reality is a persuasive description of "things as they are," and once situations are so described, certain responses are eliminated and others seem right. Decisions are discussed and debated within the rhetorical description, ever with an eye toward action. Every society has a need to make sense of things, of its identity as a people or a nation and of the world it inhabits. Government leaders need to provide rationales for their decisions in order to govern. Leaders must convince the public "that the government's decisions are legitimate and good and that its foreign policy is correct." [19](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Politics is about power, and political power functions within the context of a perceived political reality. Citizens, likewise, need to make sense of things. Without a sense of political reality, the "way things are," the individual is helpless to understand the myriad of facts and opinions that one is bombarded with daily, especially the things that are far-off and cannot be experienced directly. This need to make sense of the political world evokes a constant outpouring of rhetoric, not only by political leaders but by opinion leaders from all strata of society. In speeches, newspaper editorials, magazine articles, and the like people make rhetorical efforts to argue and describe the "way things are," in short, to understand political reality. Such efforts become intensive and extensive when an old order of political reality changes, as when World War II ended, and a new order is needed to make sense out of the confusion that accompanies the fall of the old. For political rhetoric to function in this fashion, three essential conditions must exist: (1) a "raw" event and/or events or its corollary, confusion about events; (2) a rhetoric that clarifies and assigns meanings to these events; (3) publicity for the rhetoric as others share it at the time. All three of these came together to produce the cold war. But a study of political rhetoric as political reality is more than that. If we "define and then see," such a concept applies both to decisionmakers as well as the general public. The language people use becomes a part of what they see because people cannot have definitions without language. In many respects, we are prepared to see what our language has prepared us to see. We account for the rhetoric used in relation to any event in great part through the preconceptions on which it is based. To a substantial degree the rhetoric that accompanies any event comes from an a priori rhetoric, based on values that have come to be regarded as basic beliefs, on a preexisting language that is always present exerting its influence in shaping our consciousness, on previous interpretations of past events that may or may not be similar to current events. In such ways are we both liberated and imprisoned by language. Government officials and others do not construct a language or a rhetoric out of thin air; they inherit it from the past and modify or adapt it to meet current or future concerns. Robert Funk observed, "Language does not merely stand at our beck and call; it is there before we are, it situates us, it restricts our horizon, it refuses us its total complicity." [20](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Even as the language politicians use can be dynamic and changing, it also is dependent on rhetorical traditions created previously. The rhetoric of the cold war grew in large part out of preexisting rhetorics as diverse as Churchill's long-standing antibolshevism and the war language of World War II, to name only a few. This analysis demonstrates that the events that contributed to the cold war after 1945 had a rhetorical climate that preceded them as well as a rhetorical interpretation that accompanied them. The latter grew out of the former, took a particular direction, and molded the meaning of events to the extent that they created an all-pervasive political reality that not only "explained" events but became landmark events in and of themselves, ordering and interpreting future events as they occurred. Two important points need to be made. First, in the world of practical politics a political rhetoric is often constructed quickly and on an ad hoc basis. George Elsey, a member of President Truman's staff, stated the case for politicians succinctly: "You don't sit down and take time to think through and debate ad nauseam all the points [about an issue]. . . . You don't have time. Later somebody can sit around for days and weeks and figure out how things might have been done differently. This is all very well and very interesting but quite irrelevant." [21](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) One must add that it is only irrelevant for those who believe that whatever action is taken and whatever rhetoric constructed to justify that action constituted the most prudent action and rhetoric. For the critic reexamination is always required because language has consequences, often creating the first conception of a political reality of an event and then creating a lasting meaning of that event. Second, the creation of a rhetorical reality is a process, rarely a single event. In the rhetoric of the cold war the reality grew over a period of years before it took hold and became elevated to the level of sacred doctrine, an ideological doctrine whose fundamental principles few dared to challenge and to which almost all had to pay rhetorical respects even when they disagreed about how those principles applied to particular situations. The failures of the architects of the American cold war -- Truman, Acheson, and Kennan -- to restrict the political reality they had created provide compelling illustrations of the power of their own rhetoric. Before getting to the ways in which this rhetorical process worked to define the nature and scope of the cold war, we need to identify the elements that were crucial to its development. Names, Metaphors, and Definitions Thus far we have argued that language is an essential part of reality, not merely a tool to interpret events. Language itself is a creative act, not an added-on interpretation that comes from an act. It is the confluence of act and language that is the first step in creating reality, a "raw" event and the political meaning persuasively expressed that is attached to that event. Language and events cannot be easily separated once they become public currency. Again, we turn to Funk who noted: Language and understanding arise together, are reciprocal. The common [event or actuality] to which they refer both precedes and follows. It makes them possible, and yet the common reality does not become audible without language and understanding. Language and understanding both arise out of and invoke shared reality. [22](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) This process of uniting the two, we call a *language-event,* a unity of political language and actual events that creates political reality both in perception and in expression. For this analysis of the cold war reality, there are three important ways in which language created that reality: through naming, through metaphor, and through formal definitions. Kenneth Burke remarked that all language is "magical" or creative because "the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something-other." [23](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) In this understanding of language we are not merely *saying* something when we use language, we are *doing* something. When we name an object, it becomes real for us because naming "does not mean inventing a convenient designation, but giving reality to the object, calling it into [meaningful] existence." [24](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) This conception of language has its roots in antiquity, and although it was once discarded by the modern scientific world as a mythical understanding of reality, its significance has been rediscovered by Burke and the postmodernists. The scientific conception of language came to be associated with its noetic function, that is, a word was thought of as a symbol that only conveys meaning, a tool separate from the thing it described. Louis Halle used this concept of language in describing the changes that American leaders had to make in foreign policy in the postwar period. He argued that the confusions of that period and Soviet expansionism required a new language to express the new "realities" of tensions in the world: What was required in the first instance, for the replacement of the projected foreign policy by a policy applicable to the developing circumstances, was a conscious recognition of the realities to which it would have to be applicable. The American Government and the American people . . . would then have to accept the need to re-establish a balance of power by filling the remaining power vacuums and thereby limiting the further expansion of the Russian empire. Such a conceptual change as this, while it might take place more rapidly in the subconscious mind, could hardly be explicitly formulated and adopted as such until after an interval of intellectual confusion and inner conflict, during which some persons would continue to adhere with a sort of blind desperation to the outdated concepts and their attendant language, while others would recognize the increasingly manifest realities without being able to find a coherent intellectual pattern or forms of words into which to fit them. [25](http://www.questia.com/read/14289633) Clearly, Halle viewed language as a tool of expression, not as a creative rhetorical process. For Halle, the new cold war "reality" existed waiting only to be "recognized." Once recognized, the task for U.S. leaders became an independent search for appropriate concepts and language to express that reality. In the older mythic realm, however, language and the comprehension of reality were more deeply fused. This latter conception of language guides our understanding about rhetoric's role in the political construction of reality.

#### 2) Critical praxis outweighs policy making --- voting affirmative guarantees error replication. Only a radical break from dominant paradigms can avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy

Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated.¶ This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15¶ The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power.¶ In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security.¶ This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.¶ There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. Firstcomes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, thenspecific policies may follow.¶ As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### 5) If we win framework we don’t need an alt --- the ballot is a referendum on whether the aff’s scholarship is productive --- if a student turns in an F paper the teacher doesn’t have to write a better paper to conclude it was bad --- this comes before any alt or perm args --- plan focus rigs debate against investigating assumptions --- this cedes the political.

**Gunder et al 9**, Aukland University senior planning lecturer, **2009**

(Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on¶ appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge¶ clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired¶ enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what¶ is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted¶ and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy.¶ Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a¶ lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they¶ are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack¶ and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues.¶ Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "dominant stakeholders” can¶ ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many,¶ whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and¶ Hillier 2007a, 469). The current “post-democratic” milieu facilitates the above through avoidance¶ of critical policy debate challenging favoured orthodox positions and policy¶ approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative “solutions”, are¶ eradicated from political debate so that while “token institutions of liberal democracy”:¶ are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003,¶ 59). Consequently, “the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are¶ repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more¶ critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007,¶ 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues¶ to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or¶ "best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further¶ maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "a cover and¶ shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the¶ political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception¶ as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time,¶ adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses¶ for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game¶ (Blair and Kumar 1997).

#### 6) Representations must precede policy discussion.

Crawford 2002 (Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ.   Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21, MT)

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical importof representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### 7) You are not a policy-maker—pretending you are causes absolving of individual responsibility—ensures the aff’s impacts are inevitable and link turns their cede the political arguments.

Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, “The Will to Violence”, p. 10-11, MT)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.  Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks:  The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194) It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)

#### 4. Rejecting in every instance is key.

**Neocleous 8** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re afﬁrming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves to the possibility of** building real alternatives **to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics**. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

#### 5. Perm crowds out epistemological self-reflection which is key to prevent error replication

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It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transnational corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimensions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80

#### 6. Cloaking DA - The reasons for pursuing a policy are central to understanding it, we must reject liberal reforms that mask the security apparatus by shifting the frame of debate because they effectively kill critique and sustain security logic.

Burke 2007 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2007, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 1-4, MT)

Working between international relations, philosophy, and political and cultural theory, and with those whose daily suffering is most shocking and unbearable in mind, this book thus brings sustained critical attention to the promises and practices of security, ethics and violence as they manifest themselves in the statecraft, foreign policy, diplomacy, terrorism, war-making, geopolitics and strategy of the last few decades. This book does so to sound a warning: that not only are global patterns of insecurity, violence and conflict getting ever more destructive and out of hand, but that the dominant conceptual and policy frameworks we use to understand and respond to them are deeply inadequate and dangerous. Given this danger, the book insists upon a ‘critical’ approach: one that refuses to accept the representations of the world most available to us and apparently most credible, but instead questions the very categories we have used to understand and shape our modernity and its relation to power, violence and existence. Hence none of these things – ethics, violence, security or war – are taken for granted, as if we know what they are and how they fit together. Rather this is a book that asks about the kind of violence that war is, that we think and allow it to be; that asks about the kind of ethics that relates to security and violence, that by turns condemns, demands or exonerates killing; that asks about the violence that we think enables, defends or threatens security; and that asks about the security that conjures violence from its soul, which pushes kindness or cruelty or murder through its veins like a life-giving fluid. It asks if violence is really as rational, ethical and controllable as we believe; if a security that hinges upon violence is tenable or meaningful, and if it can be refigured; and it asks if ethics can offer us a path beyond violence or is in danger of becoming reduced to it. While a concern with ethics, as both a source of hope and danger, is a central theme of the book, it is not based on an approach that brings ‘ethics’, as a fully formed and systematic body of principles, to something that lies outside it: ‘security’, ‘war’ or ‘international relations’. Rather it interrogates the very practical and conceptual structure of these processes, along with ethical 4 reasoning itself, in order to understand the ethical outcomes of various approaches to security and violence even when they claim to be governed by the demands of ethics. Nor are ethics, security and violence the limit of this book’s concerns. It puts significant related ideas under scrutiny: sovereignty, freedom, identity and power. These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'. It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity.  As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.